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Abstract
Web request query strings (queries), which pass parameters to the referenced resource, are always manipulated by
attackers to retrieve sensitive data and even take full control of victim web servers and web applications. However,
existing malicious query detection approaches in the current literature cannot cope with changing web attacks with
constant detection models. In this paper, we propose AMODS, an adaptive system that periodically updates the
detection model to detect the latest unknown attacks. We also propose an adaptive learning strategy, called SVM
HYBRID, leveraged by our system to minimize manual work. In the evaluation, an up-to-date detection model is
trained on a ten-day query dataset collected from an academic institute’s web server logs. Our system outperforms
existing web attack detection methods, with an F-value of 94.79% and FP rate of 0.09%. The total number of malicious
queries obtained by SVM HYBRID is 2.78 times that by the popular Support Vector Machine Adaptive Learning (SVM
AL) method. The malicious queries obtained can be used to update the Web Application Firewall (WAF) signature
library.
Keywords: Web attacks, Web request query strings, Adaptive learning, SVM, Intrusion detection, Anomaly detection
1. Introduction
Web attacks are attacks that exclusively use the
HTTP/HTTPS protocol. Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report (ISTR) [1] reveals that the number of we-
b attacks explosively increased, reaching 1.1 million every
day in 2015, more than twice the rate in 2014 (0.493 mil-
lion). Among web attacks, code injection attacks against
web applications [2] increased each year and accounted for
at least 96.15% of web attacks in 2015, according to the
Imperva Web Application Attack Report (WAAR) [3–5].
In 2015, Team GhostShell claimed to have hacked numer-
ous websites using SQL injection (SQLI) attacks [6], and
disclosed thousands of compromised account details, in-
cluding emails, user names, addresses, telephone numbers,
and other privacy information [7].
This paper focuses on the most frequent types of web-
based code-injection attacks in 2015 [5], namely, Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) attack [8], SQLI attack, Directory Traver-
sal (DT) [5], and Remote File Inclusion (RFI) [5], respec-
tively accounting for 49.09%, 28.32%, 9.82% and 8.92%
of the entire web attacks. Attack vectors of these attacks
exist in user input. Whenever user input is improperly
handled, these attacks can succeed. Since most user input
data exists in queries 1, detecting malicious queries is the
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +8601069671800.
Email addresses: dongying115@mails.ucas.ac.cn (Ying
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1Web request query string is consistently termed as query in this
paper for simplicity.
core of detecting web-based code injection attacks. For we-
b applications whose source code is unavailable or difficult
to obtain, Web Intrusion Detection Systems (Web IDSs)
are the only option [9]. A web IDS acts as an intermediate
layer between protected web applications and users, and
analyzes web traffic to detect possibly malicious activities.
A considerable amount of effort has been made to de-
tect malicious queries in web requests using web IDSs.
Two major detection approaches are utilized: signature-
based detection and anomaly-based detection. A popular
signature-based detection approach is WAF, which main-
tains a signature library of known signatures, and com-
pares new web requests with the signatures. Signature-
based approaches are efficient in detecting known attacks
with a low False Positive (FP) rate, but unable to de-
tect previously unknown attacks(e.g., zero-day attacks).
Anomaly-based detection approaches [10–15] usually rely
on a detection model to identify anomalous web requests.
In contrast to signature-based approaches, anomaly-based
approaches can detect unknown attacks, but with a high
FP rate. The two approaches are often applied in a com-
plementary fashion in web IDSs: anomaly detection serves
to discover unknown attacks, whose attack signatures are
then utilized by signature-based approach for detection.
The ability to detect unknown attacks has drawn wide a-
cademic attention to anomaly-based approaches.
However, existing anomaly-based approaches for web at-
tack detection are constant, in other words, they usually
collect all training data once to induce a constant detec-
tion model. Since attackers have become more sophisti-
cated and utilized more advanced web attack toolkits, the
Preprint submitted to Computing Research Repository November 28, 2017
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
07
77
4v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
8 N
ov
 20
17
detection model might become obsolete and outdated, in-
capable of detecting the latest malicious queries in web
attacks. Previous adaptive attack detection methods [16–
18] are designed for network intrusions and are not appli-
cable to web attacks. A practical solution for keeping the
web attack detection model constantly updated is to in-
corporate the latest important queries, including informa-
tive benign queries and representative malicious queries.
The existing approach to obtaining the latest important
queries is randomly selecting requests from web traffic and
then manually labeling them. Unfortunately, the majority
of randomly selected queries are similar benign ones, and
there is low probability of a query being important. Since
web traffic is huge, it does take considerable manual label-
ing work to obtain important queries. This challenge has
motivated our research work to build a malicious query de-
tection system that can adaptively incorporate the latest
important queries to update the detection model.
In this paper, we address the issues related to the adap-
tive detection of malicious queries in web attacks. We
present AMODS, an adaptive system for this purpose.
AMODS leverages an efficient adaptive learning strategy,
SVM HYBRID, which is a hybrid of Suspicion Selection
(SS) and Exemplar Selection (ES). The former features in
acquiring the most important informative queries, namely,
suspicions, while the latter specializes in harvesting rep-
resentative malicious queries, exemplars. Suspicions and
exemplars are called important queries. AMODS aims to
identify attacks as early as possible by periodically check-
ing the latest important queries. The number of important
queries is trivial, so manual labeling work is reduced to
the minimum. The important queries are then incorporat-
ed into the training pool to update the detection model,
which is a stacking-based ensemble classifier, composed
of three base classifiers and a meta classifier. SVM [19]
is used as its meta classifier, so that SVM HYBRID can
exert the detection model to obtain important queries. A
ten-day query dataset collected from an academic institute
website’s web server logs is used for evaluation. Since the
logs record requests passing through a commercial WAF,
malicious queries obtained by our system can be used to
update the WAF signature library.
The main contributions of this study are as follows:
• We present AMODS, an adaptive system for detect-
ing malicious queries in web attacks. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work in the adaptive
detection of web attacks.
• We propose SVM HYBRID, an adaptive learning s-
trategy designed for the efficient selection of impor-
tant queries.
• We employ stacking, a meta-learning [20] based en-
semble classifier, as the underlying detection model
for accurate malicious query detection.
• AMODS outperforms existing web attack detection
methods with an F-value of 94.79% and FP-rate of
0.09% on a real-world ten-day query set. The total
number of malicious queries obtained by SVM HY-
BRID is 2.78 times that by SVM AL during the ten-
day detection using AMODS.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides background and related work. Detailed de-
sign and implementation of the system, together with the
proposed adaptive learning strategy, namely, SVM HY-
BRID, will be presented in Section 3. Section 4 shows data
collection and preprocessing. Next, Section 5 introduces
the process of the determination of feature reduction and
stacked classifiers, then shows the efficacy of our system.
In addition, AMODS is compared with constant model-
s and adaptive models, including SVM AL and random
selection, in terms of detection performance and the num-
ber of malicious queries obtained. Detection performance
comparisons with related work are also demonstrated. Af-
terwards, we clarify some relevant issues of our approach
in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. Background and related work
2.1. Background
Queries contain most user inputs and are thus closely
related to web-based code injection attacks, which are the
most threatening web-layer attacks [3–5]. Therefore, our
work concentrates on malicious query detection in order
to detect web-based code injection attacks. Queries can
be found in HTTP GET requests recorded in web server
logs. Figure 1 shows a web server log entry in Common
Log Format (CLF), consisting of various items, such as the
source IP address, timestamp, sever response status code,
user agent header field, and the actual web request string.
The framed text in the request string is a query, which our
system examines. A query is identified by a leading “?”
character following the referenced resource, and lists pairs
of parameter names and values.
Malicious queries in web-based code injection attacks
and normal queries are different in character distribution
and character sequences. Table 1 compares a normal re-
quest and four types of code injection attacks analyzed in
this paper: SQLI attack, XSS attack, DT attack, and RFI
attack. We include Remote Code Execution (RCE) into
XSS attack, since RCE is essentially a special kind of XSS
attack [21]. The requests in Table 1 are forwarded to a
223.241.162.53 - - 
[12/May/2015:23:59:59 +0800] 
"GET /resource? parameter1=value1&parameter2=value2  
HTTP/1.1"  200  1922 
"http://shopping/start.html" 
"Mozilla/4.08 [en] (Win98; I ;Nav)"
query
Figure 1: Web server access log entry
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Table 1: Comparison of normal queries and malicious queries in web-based code injection attacks
No. Type Query in a web request URL
(a) Normal http://www.victim.com/index.php?postID=123
(b) SQLI
http://www.victim.com/index.php?postID=’/**/union/**/select/**/0,
concat(username,0x3a,password)/**/from/**/users/*’
(c) XSS
http://www.victim.com/index.php?postID=<script>document.location
=“http://vicious site/stealcookie.cgi?”+document.cookie</script>
(d) DT http://www.victim.com/index.php?postID=../../../../etc/passwd
(e) RFI http://www.victim.com/index.php?postID=http://vicious site/hack.txt?ls
vulnerable script named “index.php” in a forum website,
and the script can extract posts from the database and
present a post to a user. “postID” is a parameter name
for this script and takes an integer input value as the post
ID while recording the transaction. As shown in Table
1, (a) “postID=123” is a normal query, and (b)-(e) are
malicious queries. (b) is a typical SQLI attack that at-
tempts to obtain confidential data from a restricted table.
(c) conducts an XSS attack to obtain user cookies using a
Common Gateway Interface (CGI) script on the attacker
host. (d) conducts a DT exploit to discover the file “pass-
wd” using string “../../../”. Since “passwd” is a local file
on the vulnerable server, (d) is also called Local File Inclu-
sion (LFI) attack. (e) tries to load “hack.txt” file, a bash
shell, from a remote malicious sever, and execute the “ls”
command within the bashshell in an RFI attack.
2.2. Related work
Applying anomaly detection to attack detection has
been an active research area. Based on whether a de-
tection method can adapt to the change of web attacks,
we divide existing web attack and HTTP attack detec-
tion techniques that use anomaly detection schemes into
two categories: adaptive detection and constant detection.
Adaptive detection methods always incorporate new traf-
fic data to induce an up-to-date detection model, while
constant detection methods use a period of traffic data to
build a detection model once and use it for all later detec-
tion.
Unfortunately, existing adaptive detection techniques
[16–18] are designed for network intrusion detection. They
might not be suitable for web attack detection, since the
landscape of network intrusions differs from web attacks.
Malicious queries in web attacks have more subtle distinc-
tions from legitimate queries in normal requests. Con-
stant detection methods [10–14] cannot detect the latest
unknown attacks. The adaptive detection of web attacks
has been found deficient.
In this paper, AMODS is proposed to bridge the gap
between adaptive detection and web attack detection. As
far as we know, this is the first research in the adaptive
detection of web attacks. Figure 2 gives our taxonomy of
the latest research on methods that use anomaly detection
to detect web attacks as well as HTTP attacks.
2.2.1. Adaptive detection
Adaptive detection can detect the latest unknown at-
tacks by adapting to the changing behaviors of attacks,
yet adaptive detection methods to date have been only
related to network intrusion detection.
HTTP attack detection. These detection methods take
network traffic of port 80, namely HTTP traffic, as data
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  N-gram analysis
  One-class classifier
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  Dynamic clustering
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  2014 - Oza et al. [28]
  2016 - Swarnkar [30]
  2006 - Robertson et al. [12]
  2009 - Song et al. [13]
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  2014 - Wang et al. [17]
  2015 - Zhang et al. [18]
 Web attack detetcion   Adaptive learning   Our contribution: AMODS
Figure 2: Taxonomy of the latest academic research on anomaly detection methods of web attacks and HTTP attacks
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source and analyze HTTP packet payloads. Three types of
unsupervised learning techniques are utilized: (a) Statis-
tic based. Meng et al. [16] used a statistic-based approach
to develop an adaptive blacklist-based packet filter, which
can help filter out network packets based on IP confidence.
(b) Dynamic clustering. Wang et al. [17] employed Affin-
ity Propagation (AP) in dynamical clustering to detect
HTTP attacks adaptively. (c) Subspace analysis. Zhang
et al. [18] proposed Adaptive Stream Projected Outlier de-
Tector (A-SPOT), which used a novel adaptive subspace
analysis approach to detect anomalies from network con-
nections.
Our proposed system AMODS falls into the category
of adaptive methods for web attack detection. AMOD-
S leverages an efficient adaptive learning strategy, called
SVM HYBRID. Queries obtained by SVM HYBRID are
used to update the detection model periodically. AMODS
can identify attacks at an early stage with a high F-value,
and significantly improve the detection performance of the
model over time.
2.2.2. Constant detection
Constant detection methods are widely applied to intru-
sion detection. Though effective, they suffer from a high F-
P rate. To deal with this problem, we combined SVM HY-
BRID with a stacking-based detection model. Using our
detection model, we achieved the lowest FP rate in com-
parison with above constant detection methods as shown
in Section 5.4. Constant detection methods for HTTP at-
tacks and web attacks are summarized as follows.
HTTP attack detection. Constant detection methods of
HTTP attacks model packet payload in HTTP traffic, and
operate at packet layer. Four categories of detection algo-
rithms are used: (a) Markov models. Garcia-Teodoro et
al. [22] represented the normal behaviors of a service by
Markov models, aiming to generate HTTP intrusion sig-
natures for Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS).
Soon, Zhong et al. [23] used Markov models whose inputs
are each character of parameter values in normal payloads
to build the normal profile. Earlier works, such as HMM-
Payl [24], made similar use of Markov models. (b) N-gram
analysis. N-gram is a text categorization technique and is
widely used in NIDSs, such as PAYL [25], Anagram [26],
RePIDS [27] and [28]. (c) One-class classifier. McPAD
[29] detects HTTP attacks using multiple one-class SVMs,
whose outputs are combined to make a final prediction.
Recently, Swarnkar [30] adopted a one-class Multinomial
Naive Bayes classifier and used likelihood of each short se-
quences occurrence in payloads of known benign packets
as a measure to derive the degree of maliciousness of a
packet.
Web attack detection. Constant detection methods of
web-layer code injection attacks usually analyze queries in
web traffic (web server logs), and operate at application
layer. Two detection methods are mainly used: (a) Lin-
ear combination. Linear combination method creates a
profile for normal traffic and considers new web requests
with certain noticeable deviations from the normal pro-
file as attacks. Kruegel and Vigna [10, 11] were the first
to analyze web server logs to detect attacks against web
servers and web applications. They calculated the final
anomaly score for each web request using the linear com-
bination of six models, such as the character distribution
of query parameters. Robertson et al. [12] used similar
models to generalize suspicious web requests into anomaly
signatures. (b) Markov models. Spectrogram [13] used a
linear mixture of multiple Markov-chains to model queries.
(c) Wavelet transform. Kozakevicius et al. [14] proposed
a URL query string anomaly sensor based on the proper-
ties of the bidimensional Haar wavelet transform. (d) Di-
mensionality reduction. Juvonen et al. [15] proposed an
anomaly detection system to detect anomalies in queries,
and used dimensionality methods for data preprocessing.
It is worth mentioning that we only concentrate on adap-
tive detection of web attacks; two related problems, name-
ly vulnerability exploitation and signature generation, are
beyond the scope of this paper. On the one hand, the crite-
rion of query labeling is a combination of signature-based
method and manual analysis, as described in Section 6,
regardless of whether the corresponding requests success-
fully exploit the vulnerabilities of an application or not.
Web application vulnerability exploitation detection can
be done via either static analysis [31] or dynamic analysis,
such as taint tracking [32] and taint inference [33]. On
the other hand, we simply expect to obtain as many ma-
licious queries as possible to update the WAF signature
library. Signature generation is outside our subject, which
commonly uses regular expressions [34].
3. Design and implementation
In this section, we first illustrate the design of our Adap-
tive Malicious Query Detection System (AMODS, “O” for
“Q”), followed by the core adaptive learning technique,
named SVM HYBRID. Lastly, we introduce our stacking-
based training and classification.
3.1. System design
In this paper, we introduce the concept of importan-
t queries, which consist of the most informative normal
queries and the most representative malicious queries, as
mentioned in Section 1. The goal of AMODS is to iden-
tify attacks as early as possible by periodically checking
the latest important queries. To reach this goal, our sys-
tem leverages an adaptive learning approach called SVM
HYBRID to obtain important queries.
The system is initialized with a training pool composed
of a small set of labeled queries, from which the initial
detection model is trained. The detection model is based
on stacking, and composed of three base classifiers and a
meta classifier. SVM is used as its meta classifier, so that
SVM HYBRID could exert the detection model to obtain
important queries. To update the initial detection model,
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Figure 3: System overview
the system takes web server logs as its data source, and
examines queries in HTTP GET requests in batch mod-
e. These queries are called unknown queries, since their
class labels are unknown. Classified unknown queries are
analyzed by SVM HYBRID to obtain the smallest num-
ber of important queries for labeling. Thus, the manual
work is greatly reduced. As shown in Figure 3, the system
proceeds as follows.
1. Collecting unknown queries. Unknown queries are
collected from N -day web requests. Since attacks in
the web requests have been filtered out by WAFs, the
collected unknown queries contain benign queries and
malicious queries undetected by WAFs.
2. Data preprocessing (Section 4.2). Data preprocessing
transforms raw queries into feature vectors in batches
of N days, including data preparation, feature con-
struction, and feature reduction.
3. Classification (Section 3.3). Unknown queries on the
1st day are classified using the current detection mod-
el.
4. Queries selection (Section 3.2). A fixed number of im-
portant queries are obtained from classified unknown
queries on the 1st day using SVM HYBRID.
5. Label the obtained important queries manually.
6. Update the WAF signature library using the obtained
important queries that are labeled as malicious.
7. Add all the labeled important queries into the training
pool2 .
8. Update the detection model (Section 3.3).
9. Iterate steps (3)-(8) for unknown queries in the rest
N − 1 days.
2In following text, the terms “training pool”, “training set”, and
“labeled set” are used interchangeably.
3.2. SVM HYBRID
SVM HYBRID, our proposed adaptive learning strat-
egy, obtains important queries to update the malicious
query detection model. SVM HYBRID operates in the
kernel feature space of SVM (Support Vector Machine),
and relies on positions of query samples in SVM kernel
feature space to decide queries for labeling. SVM has per-
formed extremely well in many domains, particularly those
involving text classification.
Given a domain X, a linear classifier used to separate
positive and negative samples [19] is defined in terms of a
hyperplane
wTx+ b = 0,
(
w ∈ RN , b ∈ R) , (1)
where w is the orthogonal normal vector to the hyperplane
and is assumed to point towards the positive class, and
b is the bias of the hyperplane. The linear classifier is
corresponding to the decision rule
y = sgn(wTx+ b). (2)
Given training set T = {(x1, y1) , (x2, y2) , . . . , (xn, yn)},
where xi ∈ RN is a feature vector, and yi ∈ {−1, 1} is a
class label, the margin is defined as the maximal perpen-
dicular distance between samples of the two classes. SVM
aims to find the optimal linear classifier whose separating
hyperplane maximizes the margin. w of the optimal linear
classifier is solved as
w =
n∑
i=1
aiyixi. (3)
When original input samples are non-linearly separable,
the samples could be mapped to a new kernel feature s-
pace where they are linearly separable. Given a feature
mapping process ϕ, the corresponding kernel is defined as
K(x, z) = ϕ (x)
T
ϕ (z) . (4)
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Using Equation (3) and (4), the decision value in Equa-
tion (2) can be rewritten as:
f(x) =
n∑
i=1
αiyiK (xi, x) + b. (5)
f(x) is the kernel distance between a sample x and the hy-
perplane. Calculating K(x, z) is usually trivial. Besides,
according to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions,
αi is non-zero only for samples that are closet to the hy-
perplane, namely support vectors, the number of which is
usually small. Therefore, the kernel distance is efficient to
compute.
For data that are non-linearly separable though mapped
to infinite dimensional feature space, the optimization
problem can be formulated as
maxα
n∑
i=1
αi − 1
2
n∑
i,j=1
αiαjyiyjx
T
i xj
s.t. 0 ≤ αi ≤ C, i = 1, . . . , n
n∑
i=1
αiyi = 0,
(6)
where penalty parameter C controls the relative weighting
of a large margin and low misclassification rate of train-
ing data. A small C prefers a large margin, at the cost
of a large number of misclassified training samples, corre-
sponding to a soft margin classifier. By contrast, a large
C means a hard margin classifier.
The illustrative graph of SVM HYBRID is presented
in Figure 4. The middle solid line is the separating hy-
perplane, while the two external solid lines indicate the
margin. The upper side of the hyperplane is the malicious
side. “+” represents a query in the positive class, name-
ly, a malicious query, while “−” stands for a query in the
negative class: a normal query. SVM HYBRID comprises
of Suspicion Selection (SS) and Exemplar Selection (ES).
SS obtains the most important informative queries, which
are suspected of being malicious and thus are called suspi-
cions. Suspicions are within the prone-to-be-misclassified
region, called the confusing region: the grey area delimit-
ed by two dashed lines in Figure 4. The two points sur-
rounded by red circles within the confusing region are sus-
picions. Conversely, ES obtains the most representative
malicious queries, which are called exemplars, since each
of them is an exemplar of similar malicious queries. Ex-
emplars lie in the malicious side and far away from the
hyperplane. As shown in Figure 4, the four points sur-
rounded by red circles on the upper side are exemplars.
The main contribution of suspicions and exemplars is also
different: the former contributes more to detection per-
formance improvement, while the latter is conducive more
to harvesting truly malicious queries. The contribution of
SVM HYBRID is a hybrid of these strengths.
SS and ES operate on two disjointed subsets of each un-
known query set. SVM HYBRID starts with SS on one
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Figure 4: Illustrative graph of SVM HYBRID
subset and then switches to ES on the other subset. The
ratio of the size of query subset for SS to that for ES is de-
noted as θ. θ is an adjustable parameter in SVM HYBRID
to address the tradeoff between detection performance im-
provement and the number of malicious queries obtained.
The effects of θ set to different values are evaluated in
Experiment 2 (Section 5.1).
Moreover, SVM HYBRID is suitable for SVMs with any
kernels. Radial basis function (RBF) kernel and Polyno-
mial kernel, two widely used kernels, are tested in our ex-
periment, respectively defined as
K(x, y) = e−γ‖x−y‖
2
(7)
K(x, y) = ((x · y) + θ)d . (8)
3.2.1. Suspicion Selection (SS)
Adaptive learning with SVM uncertainty sampling is al-
so known as SVM active learning (we call it SVM AL in
the rest of this paper) [35, 36]. SS is similar to SVM AL,
since they all select unlabeled samples within the margin.
However, SVM AL simply selects samples closet to the
hyperplane and does not consider their distribution. Con-
sequently, similar samples might be selected, making SVM
AL prone to sample bias. Labeling similar samples is al-
so a waste of manual work. Therefore, given a large pool
of unlabeled samples, it is desirable to preserve the densi-
ty distribution of samples in the pool during the learning
process.
Our proposed Suspicion Selection (SS) pursues the idea
of preserving data distribution by using clustering to find
potential informative queries from unknown queries within
the confusing region. In brief, SVM AL concentrates on
the most informative data, while SS focuses on the most
important informative data so that data redundancy is re-
duced to the minimum. The procedure of SS is as follows.
Firstly, the confusing region is determined. The set of
misclassified queries in a training set that fall into the mar-
gin during training is denoted as Q. Queries in Q are sort-
ed in order according to their kernel distances computed
6
using Equation (5). The query in Q with the minimal ker-
nel distance (the “+” point with the rectangular frame in
Figure 4) determines the lower boundary of the confusing
region (the lower dashed line). Oppositely, the query in Q
with the maximal kernel distance (the “−” point with the
rectangular frame) determines the upper boundary of the
confusing region (the upper dashed line). That is,
flower = min
x∈Q
f(x) (9)
fupper = max
x∈Q
f(x). (10)
The confusing region is defined as
Confusing region⇐ flower ≤ f(x) ≤ fupper. (11)
To ensure the existence of the confusing region, the mar-
gin should be wide enough to allow misclassifications of
training samples within the margin. That is, the meta
classifier SVM of our detection model should be a soft
margin classifier. The training misclassification rate and
detection performance of the detection model can be bal-
anced by adjusting the penalty parameter C and SVM
kernel parameter of the meta classifier SVM.
Secondly, K-medoids clustering [37] is performed on the
unknown queries that fall into the confusing region. The
final cluster centers are suspicions. K-medoids begins with
K randomly selected samples as medoids (cluster center-
s). Then each remaining sample is assigned to the cluster
whose medoid is the closet to it. That is, the partitioning
method is based on the principle of minimizing the sum
of the distances between each sample and its correspond-
ing referenced medoid. This sum is denoted as E, and is
defined as
E =
k∑
j=1
∑
x∈Cj
|ϕ(x)− ϕ(Mj)|, (12)
where x is a given sample in cluster Cj , whose cluster cen-
ter isMj . |ϕ(x)−ϕ(Mj)| is the Euclidean distance between
x and Mj in kernel feature space, and using Equation (4),
it can be given by
|ϕ(x)− ϕ(Mj)|
=
√
K(x, x) +K(Mj ,Mj)− 2K(x,Mj). (13)
The K cluster centers with which E reaches its mini-
mum value are optimal. The partitioning step is repeated
until the number of unknown samples within the confus-
ing region is less than K. When partitioning terminates,
the final cluster centers are the most important informa-
tive samples, called suspicions. Suspicions are important
samples whose class labels cause the most confusion to the
classifier.
Figure 4 shows that the confusing region covers two clus-
ters, each represented by a dashed circle. Their cluster
centers are the two points surrounded by red circles in the
two dashed circles. One cluster center is a normal query
and another is a misclassified malicious query. In other
words, suspicions might be misclassified and also might
not be malicious. On the contrary, queries obtained by
Exemplar Selection (ES) are highly likely to be malicious.
ES is described in the following subsection.
3.2.2. Exemplar Selection (ES)
Exemplar Selection (ES) serves to obtain representa-
tive malicious queries, called exemplars, from the unknown
queries. New web attacks are very commonly variants of
existing attacks. Queries in variant attacks might be simi-
lar to queries in existing attacks. Labeling similar queries
would unnecessarily increase manual labeling workload.
As a result, we hope that each exemplar is the unknown
malicious query that differs most from all the malicious
queries in the current labeled set.
To attain this goal, we apply the Kernel Farthest-First
(KFF) algorithm [38], a greedy heuristic, to obtain exem-
plars from the malicious side of the SVM hyperplane. KF-
F always chooses from the unlabeled query set the query
that is the farthest from all the malicious queries in the la-
beled set. Given unlabeled query set U and labeled query
set L, the farthest distance is defined as the maximum of
the sum of distances between each malicious query y in L
and a query x in U in kernel feature space. Formally, the
optimal x is determined by
arg max
x∈U
<
∑
x∈L
|ϕ (x)− ϕ (y)| >, (14)
where |ϕ(x)−ϕ(y)| is computed using Equation (13). Each
optimal x is an exemplar, and is added to the labeled set.
As can be seen from Figure 4, ES obtains four exemplars,
represented by four points surrounded by red circles. One
of the exemplars is a misclassified normal query. This is
unsurprising, since misclassification might happen. Never-
theless, most exemplars are still truly malicious. At each
iteration of the adaptive detection process, suspicions and
exemplars are manually labeled and used for refining the
decision boundary of the meta classifier SVM of the detec-
tion model.
Specifically, SS uses the kernel distance to the hyper-
plane, which is already solved when a sample is classified
by a SVM, while ES uses the kernel distance to malicious
queries in current training set, which could be computed
using the efficient-to-compute kernel function. Thus SVM
HYBRID is applicable for real-time attack detection sce-
narios.
3.3. Training and classification
In machine learning, learning bias refers to any pref-
erence for choosing one hypothesis that explains the da-
ta over other equally acceptable hypotheses [39]. Meta-
learning is the ability to learn from different learning biases
that are appropriate for a particular problem by enriching
the model hypothesis space [40]. Meta-learning is also an
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Table 2: Description of web server logs and data preprocessing
Item
Raw logs Data preprocessing
Duration Log size Original Cleaned Normalized Filtered
(days) (GB) requests queries queries queries
# 10 6.11 476,459 188,290 118,928 112,397
Table 3: Statistics of query dataset
#Queries Initial set Ten unknown sets
Benign 80 99,080
Malicious 20 920
Total 100 100,000
ensemble classifier technique [41]. Ensemble classifier tech-
niques proved to be effective in intrusion detection, such
as HMMPayl [24] and McPAD [29]. The ability to learn
from different learning biases makes meta-learning an ap-
propriate approach for malicious query detection, due to
the complex, dynamic, confrontational nature of its prob-
lem domain.
In our approach, we employ stacked generalization [42],
as well as named stacking, a well-known meta-learning
technique, as our underlying detection model. The key
idea of stacking is to train a meta classifier from the pre-
diction results of base classifiers [42]. By using a meta
classifier, stacking tries to induce which base classifiers are
reliable and which are not during training. During clas-
sification, a test sample is classified by each of the base
classifiers; then these classifications are fed into the meta
classifier that makes the final decision. The base classifiers
in our stacking detection model are chosen from three dif-
ferent classifier families. This combination scheme of base
classifiers serves to obtain learning diversity and overcomes
the learning bias of similar classifiers in the same catego-
ry. The meta classifier in our stacking detection model is
SVM so that SVM HYBRID can operate on our stacking
detection model by exerting its meta classifier SVM.
4. Data collection and preprocessing
4.1. Data collection
Web server logs are provided by most real-world we-
b servers. The availability of this data source is a great
advantage of our analysis. The web server logs of an a-
cademic institute during the period of July 1-10, 2016 are
used to evaluate our system. The institute uses an Apache
web server, whose logs are in CLF format as shown in Fig-
ure 1. The web application chosen from the institute’s
server offers several resources on its portal and consists
of both static and dynamic pages. In addition, this we-
b application is equipped with a commercial WAF, called
Hillstone [43], and only requests passing through the WAF
are recorded in its web server access logs.
A description of the raw logs and data preprocessing
procedure is presented in Table 2. The number of original
requests, queries after data cleaning, data normalization
and application of character filter are shown. The remain-
ing 112,397 queries are used for our analysis.
The remaining queries are labeled by means of the sig-
nature set of ModSecurity [44] and manual analysis, as de-
scribed in Section 6. ModSecurity is an open-source WAF,
used to protect Apache web servers from web attacks. The
signatures of ModSecurity are provided by the OWASP
ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) [45] project; the CRS
version we use is 2.2.9. The reason of using ModSecurity
signatures to identify attacks is its relatively better detec-
tion performance compared with other WAFs [46]. It is
worth noting that we only include the malicious queries
of the top four most threatening attacks in our dataset,
namely XSS, SQLI, RFI and DT attacks, as noted in Sec-
tion 2.
Web application concept drift occurred on the academ-
ic website within reason during the ten-day experimental
period, as described in Section 6. In order to accurately e-
valuate the performance of our adaptive detection method,
we need to alleviate the effect of concept drift on our sys-
tem. Therefore, normal queries during the ten days are
mixed up and then equally divided into ten normal query
sets.
Eleven disjointed query sets are used in our experiments,
including an initial query set and ten unknown query sets.
The initial set is used to induce the initial detection model,
while each unknown set is used to update the detection
model. The eleven sets are created from the entire 112,397
queries during the ten days. Each unknown query set is
composed of 10,000 queries on one day sequentially, and
12,397 queries are left. The number of malicious queries
in the ten unknown query sets is imbalanced: 95, 112, 97,
100, 107, 96, 92, 99, 127 and 108. To make the number of
malicious queries in each unknown set equal, we use the
minimum number of 92 on the 7th day as the number of
malicious queries in each unknown set. Then we replace
surplus malicious queries in other nine unknown sets with
normal ones in the remaining 12,397 queries. These queries
are then used to create the initial query set. The detailed
statistics of the eleven sets of queries are presented in Table
3.
4.2. Data preprocessing
4.2.1. Data preparation
Our system models queries in HTTP GET requests
shown in Figure 1. To collect our query dataset, the fol-
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lowing steps are employed.
Data cleaning. Web server logs are examined to collect
successful GET requests: requests whose return code is e-
qual to or greater than 200, and less than 300. Then, static
requests (e.g., .html, .wav, .txt, .jpg) are removed. Final-
ly, the remaining successful GET requests are parsed to
extract queries like parameter1 = value1&parameter2 =
value2 in Figure 1.
Data normalization. Data normalization helps tighten
the input space, including decoding printable ASCII char-
acters, un-escaping, transforming to lowercase and remov-
ing queries whose length is less than four. After normaliza-
tion, initially different queries may appear identical. The
identical ones show as one entry in our dataset.
Character filter. The general syntax of URI in RFC 2616
[47] defines the unsafe characters that should not appear in
standard queries. We consider queries that contain any of
the unsafe characters to be malicious and propose a char-
acter filter to remove these queries. The unsafe characters
defined in RFC 2616 are as follows:
1. Any ASCII control character (octets 0-31, 128-255)
and DEL (127)
2. ASCII SP (32)
3. ”, #, %, <, >
4.2.2. Feature construction
Feature construction transforms each query into a nu-
merical feature vector of N -grams. An N -gram is an N -
character slice of a string [48], and its analysis has been
successfully applied to intrusion detection [25–28]. We use
N -gram analysis in feature extraction, taking advantage
of its two properties. N -gram analysis captures the char-
acter distribution and sequence characteristics of a string,
and using these, it is able to distinguish malicious queries
from normal ones. Furthermore, N -gram analysis is fully
automatic and requires no prior knowledge about target
web application and target attacks.
The value of N is important in N -gram analysis. When
N -gram (N ≥1) features are extracted, the input feature
space of labeled query set is defined as
S =
{
N -grami|i = 1, . . . , 63N
}
. (15)
The size of S is 63N , since 63 unique characters exist
in all the queries after data preparation. Intuitively, suffi-
ciently high-order N -grams must be used to obtain more
accurate features. However, for N=1, N -gram features
only capture the character distribution information and
lacks the sequence information, which is necessary for at-
tack detection in strings. For N=2, the character sequence
information is also included. For N>2, the number of N -
grams exponentially increases with N . The smallest num-
ber of features is already 25,507 (633), which exacts a high
cost in time and computational complexity. Therefore, we
choose N=2 to balance computational consumption and
detection performance, with only 3,969 (632) distinct N -
grams used. 65,536 (2562) N -grams would be involved in
the feature space without data normalization and charac-
ter filter. It is observable that the size of feature space
decreases by one order of magnitude after the utilization
of data normalization and character filter.
Two varieties of N -gram models are binary-based and
frequency-based. To capture the structure of queries more
accurately, a frequency-based N -gram model is applied.
Each N -gram frequency is then divided by the most fre-
quently appearing N -gram frequency in the same query.
4.2.3. Feature reduction
Feature selection serves to remove from the feature set
the N -grams that do not appear in all the queries, and
identify N -grams that aid classification. The number of
useful N -grams obtained by feature selection is around
1,000, which is still a large number. A large feature set is
impractical in our learning task, since our query dataset
is huge. In addition, vast features usually do not enhance
classification performance and sometimes even degrade it.
Hence, to alleviate the curse of dimensionality, dimension-
ality reduction is implemented after feature selection.
Juvonen et al. [15] also applied dimensionality reduc-
tion to the feature space of queries. Our approach differs
from their work in that we apply feature selection before
dimensionality reduction in order to reduce dimensionality
reduction and training time, as well as improve classifica-
tion performance.
5. Experiments and evaluation
In this section, we report and analyze the results of a
series of experiments. Experiment 1 (Section 5.1) is con-
ducted to determine the best setting of feature reduction
and classifiers used for our stacking-based detection model.
Experiment 2 (Section 5.2) observes the efficacy of SVM
HYBRID in AMODS, with respect to detection perfor-
mance and the number of malicious queries obtained, while
AMODS is compared with constant models (SVM model
and stacking model) and other adaptive models (adaptive
SVM model, SS, ES, SVM AL and random selection) in
Experiment 3 (Section 5.3). Lastly, Experiment 4 (Section
5.4) compares AMODS with other work re the detection
performance on our dataset.
All the experiments are implemented in Java and con-
ducted on a machine with 32-GB memory and Inter®
Core™ 2.93-GHz CPU. To allow SVM HYBRID to work
well with the meta classifier SVM of the detection model,
we implement stacking on our own. Other classifiers are
implemented using WEKA [49], except for SVM, which is
implemented using LibSVM [50].
To evaluate the classification performance of our detec-
tion model, the primary metric employed is F-value, an
effective measure for the data imbalance problem. As de-
fined in (16), F-value is a combination of Precision and
Recall. Precision measures the percentage of correctly de-
tected malicious queries in all detected malicious queries,
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while Recall shows the percentage of correctly detected
malicious queries in all truly malicious queries. β corre-
sponds to the relative importance of Precision versus Re-
call and is usually set to 1, as in [27].
F −value = (1 + β)2 ∗ Precision
β2 ∗ (Precision+Recall) (16)
In order to comprehensively assess the performance of
the detection model, True Positive (TP) rate and FP rate
are also utilized.
5.1. Experiment 1: determination of the best setting of
feature reduction and stacked classifiers
Experiment 1 aims to determine the best setting of fea-
ture reduction and stacked classifiers. The superset of the
eleven query sets shown in Table 3 is used. The super-
set consists of 100,100 queries. Queries in the superset
are represented by N -gram feature vectors in the 3,969-
dimensional feature space introduced in Section 4.2.2. The
best combination of feature selection method and top se-
lection, dimensionality reduction method, and reservation
quantity is separately determined on two SVMs, one of
which uses RBF kernel, and the other uses Polynomial ker-
nel. Additionally, base classifiers and meta classifier SVM
(RBF and Polynomial kernel) of our stacking-based de-
tection model are also determined. These experiments are
implemented on the query superset using 10-fold cross vali-
dation, amounting to 768 runs in total. The determination
metric is the average F-value of each setting. Note that
even though the best setting of feature reduction method-
s and stacked classifiers may vary among different query
datasets, the determination scheme can be universally ap-
plied to them.
Feature selection and top selection. Various combina-
tions of feature selection methods (Chi-square test, Infor-
mation Gain (IG) or Document Frequency (DF)) and top
selection (150, 200, 300, 500, 800, 1100, 1500 or 2000) are
compared in Figure 5. It shows that among the three fea-
ture selection methods, IG performs best. IG and top 800
overwhelm other combinations, and thus are chosen as the
best setting.
Dimensionality reduction and reservation quantity. Dif-
ferent combinations of dimensionality reduction methods
(Principal Component analysis [PCA] or Random Projec-
tion [RP]) and reservation quantities (10, 20, 30, 40, 60, 80,
150 or 300), as well as a full feature set, are compared in
Figure 6. As demonstrated, PCA outperforms RP at low-
er dimensions, and both of them gradually stabilize when
dimensions increase. PCA surpasses the full feature set
at the reservation quantity of 80. PCA and 80 reserved
dimensionalities are determined as the optimal setting.
Classifier selection. Using the best setting of feature se-
lection and dimensionality reduction, classifier selection is
carried out in three steps as shown in Table 4. (a) Deter-
mine base classifier candidates. Twelve single classifiers
are tested, which are chosen from five classifier families
[51]: neural networks, Bayesian, tree based, rule based,
and regression based classifiers. It can be observed from
Table 4 that the performance of single classifiers in dif-
ferent families varies greatly. Even though Bayesian clas-
sifiers perform well in the case of the training set, they
achieve low F-values of about 60% in the case of cross
validation. MLP, Random Forest, JRip and SimpleLogis-
tic perform best in their respective family in both cases.
Hence, these four classifiers are chosen as base classifier
candidates. (b) Determine the best combination of base
classifiers. All combinations of three base classifier candi-
dates, together with the combination of all the base classi-
fier candidates are tested in stacking with the meta classi-
fier being SVM with RBF kernel and Polynomial kernel re-
spectively. Table 4 indicates that the combination of Ran-
dom Forest, Logistic and MLP outperforms not only oth-
er combinations but also the best single classifier, namely,
Random Forest. Therefore, this combination of base clas-
sifiers is used in our stacking-based detection model. (c)
Determine the best meta classifier SVM. Table 4 shows
RBF kernel outperforms the Polynomial kernel, thus SVM
with RBF kernel is determined as the meta classifier of the
detection model. The optimal pair of SVM penalty param-
eter C and RBF kernel parameter γ is (C, γ) = (0.05, 2),
obtained using grid-search cross-validation [52].
5.2. Experiment 2: evaluation of AMODS
Experiment 2 reports and discusses the efficacy of our
system, specifically, the impacts of SVM HYBRID on both
the detection performance and the number of malicious
queries obtained, by adjusting θ (the ratio of the size of
query subset for SS to that for ES), which is crucial for
SVM HYBRID.
The process introduced in Section 3.1 is carried out us-
ing different values of θ, including 1:9, 2:8, 3:7, 4:6, 5:5,
6:4, 7:3, 8:2 and 9:1. In the following, we examine detailed
performances of the last five cases, which are denoted as
A, B, C, D and E respectively, and whose parameters are
listed in Table 5. Two fixed parameters are involved. The
number of obtained important queries (suspicions and ex-
emplars) on each day, denoted as M − which should be
larger than the number of malicious queries in each un-
known set (92) − is set to 150. In addition, the average
size of clusters in K-medoids clustering in SS, denoted as
R, is set to 5, a quantity we consider appropriate. Then
the number of clusters, namely K, is solved as the largest
integer value of the number of unknown queries in the con-
fusing region divided by R.
The ratio of exemplar quantity to suspicion quantity is
denoted as µ. Values of µ of the five cases during the
ten-day detection are shown in Table 6. As is evident
from Table 6, all cases show an increasing trend. This
phenomenon is due to the decreasing number of suspicions
over time. Exemplars are incremented to make up the
reduction in suspicions, so that the total of suspicions and
exemplars can stay constant. It can be concluded that ES
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Table 4: Determining base classifiers and meta classifier for stacking-based detection model
Classifier type Classifiers
F-value on F- value TP rate FP rate
training set(%) In 10-fold cross validation (%)
MLP 85.61 83.77 86.96 0.19
RBF networks 31.54 23.54 98.91 5.95
BayesNet 99.87 62.90 96.74 1.03
Naive Bayes 100.00 60.14 96.74 1.16
Random Forest 93.17 9192 98.90 0.15
Single classifiers J48graft 92.65 91.28 96.73 0.23
LMT 91.50 90.91 97.83 0.16
JRip 84.10 81.08 97.89 0.40
Decision table 57.43 52.49 85.77 1.31
Conjunctive rule 59.98 54.37 97.83 1.50
SimpleLogistic 92.92 90.10 98.91 0.19
Logistic 77.94 76.50 76.09 0.21
RF SL MLP 96.26 94.30 98.91 0.10
RF SL JRip 93.87 93.26 97.83 0.11
Base classifiers RF JRip MLP 92.98 89.11 97.83 0.20
MLP SL JRip 92.13 90.09 98.91 0.19
MLP SL JRip RF 94.37 92.32 98.24 0.16
Meta classifiers
SVM-RBF 94.21 93.23 98.99 0.10
SVM-Poly 93.63 91.19 97.96 0.19
Table 5: SVM HYBRID parameters
Parameter
Adjustable Fixed
θ M R
Case A B C D E A-E A-E
Value 5:5 6:4 7:3 8:2 9:1 150 5
becomes increasingly dominant in SVM HYBRID during
the adaptive detection process.
F-values of the five cases are compared in Figure 7,
which shows that all the cases present an increasing trend.
For the first three days, relatively low F-values are shown
for all cases. At the beginning only a few queries are in
the training pool, so the decision boundary of the detec-
tion model tends to be inaccurate. With more suspicions
and exemplars incorporated into the training pool, the de-
tection performance is rapidly improved. During the ten
days, the trends of cases C, D and E always appear above
that of A and B. Recall that θs of C, D and E are larger
than that of A and B, as shown in Table 5; thus C, D and E
obtain more suspicions. It can be inferred that suspicions
contribute more to detection performance in comparison
with exemplars. This is reasonable because the updat-
ed detection model would make more accurate prediction
of new queries, when the most important uncertain (in-
formative) queries (suspicions) are incorporated into the
training pool, rather than representative certain queries
(exemplars).
As for cases C, D and E, the trend of case C is naturally
expected to be below those of D and E, since more suspi-
cions mean better detection performance, as just inferred.
However, case C reverses this expectation: its increasing
trend is slightly steeper than those of D and E, and exceeds
them on the 8th day. A closer inspection of the three cas-
es reveals that case C obtains the largest total number of
misclassified suspicions before the 8th day among the three
cases. We attribute the superiority of case C to the mis-
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Figure 9: #Malicious queries obtained
Table 6: Comparisons of ratios (µ)
Day
µ for various cases
A B C D E
1 2.0 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7
2 3.4 2.8 2.2 1.8 1.5
3 6.1 5.0 4.0 3.4 3.0
4 11.5 9.0 7.8 6.9 5.8
5 24.0 20.4 17.8 15.7 14.0
6 49.0 36.5 29.0 29.0 24.0
7 74.0 49.0 74.0 36.5 36.5
8 74.0 74.0 49.0 49.0 49.0
9 149.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 49.0
10 149.0 149.0 149.0 74.0 74.0
Table 7: Comparisons of FP rates
Day
FP rates (%) for various cases
A B C D E
1 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
2 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.36 0.33
3 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.17 0.15
4 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.11
5 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.11
6 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.13
7 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11
8 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.12
9 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.12
10 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.11
classified suspicions it obtains, because misclassified suspi-
cions are more informative than other correctly-classified
queries. As a result, incorporating them contributes to
a more accurate decision boundary of the detection mod-
el. On the last day, case C achieves the highest F-value
(94.79%) among the five cases during the ten days, which
implies the potential of case C to improve detection per-
formance.
Figure 8 and Table 7 exhibit TP rates and FP rates of
the five cases respectively. Figure 8 explicitly shows that
their TP rates all gradually increase as days go on, while
Table 7 suggests that their FP rates rapidly decline for
Table 8: The process of case C
Day
Number of queries
Margin Conf. Suspicions Exemplars
1 450 351 70 80
2 339 237 47 103
3 257 151 29 121
4 203 87 17 133
5 152 41 8 142
6 131 24 4 146
7 114 16 3 149
8 98 14 2 148
9 85 10 2 148
10 59 8 1 149
the first three days and then gradually stabilize for the
duration. On the 10th day, the TP rates and FP rates
of the five cases fall in the ranges of [95.65%,98.91%] and
[0.09%,0.17%] separately. On this day, case C achieves the
highest TP rate and lowest FP rate of the ten days among
all the cases.
As analyzed above, case C outperforms other cases. S-
ince θ is 7:3 in case C, the each-day unknown subset for SS
and ES in case C consists of 7,000 queries and 3,000 queries
respectively. Table 8 shows the process of case C during
the ten-day detection. As Table 8 shows, on the first day,
SVM HYBRID starts with SS: the SVM margin cover-
s 450 queries in the unknown subset of SS, of which 351
queries fall into the confusing region. Then, K-medoids
clustering is performed on the 351 queries and obtains 70
suspicions. Afterwards, SVM HYBRID switches to ES on
the unknown subset for ES and obtains 80 exemplars. Ob-
tained suspicions and exemplars are manually labeled, and
added to the training pool to update the detection model.
This process repeats for the remaining days.
Truly malicious queries obtained by our system can be
used to update the WAF signature library. Hence, we ex-
pect that our system could maintain a desirable detection
performance and simultaneously obtain as many malicious
queries as possible. Figure 9 presents the trends of the
number of malicious queries obtained by the five cases.
It is clear that they all show an increasing trend. This
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Figure 12: #Mal. queries obtained
is attributable to the fact that the number of exemplars
increase while suspicions decline during the adaptive de-
tect on process, as concluded from Table 6. Suspicions are
informative queries, yet exemplars are representative ma-
licious queries. Hence, since exemplars dominate the total
malicious queries obtained, the increase in the number of
exemplars results in the increase in the number of total
malicious queries. Last but not least, case C obtains the
largest number of malicious queries among the five cases,
not only on the last day but for the entire ten days. This
confirms that suspicions help improve both the detection
ability and the number of correctly classified exemplars,
especially when θ is close to 7:3.
In summary, all the cases of AMODS yield desirable per-
formance. The experiment results demonstrate the con-
tribution of SVM HYBRID to AMODS: SS mainly helps
improve the detection performance, while ES mainly help-
s obtain malicious queries. Since the ultimate goal of our
system is to achieve a good detection performance and si-
multaneously obtain as many unknown malicious queries
as possible, case C is chosen as the optimal case and 7:3 as
the optimal value for θ, which slightly outperforms other
cases in the two respects.
5.3. Experiment 3: comparisons of constant models and
adaptive models
Experiment 3 aims to compare AMODS (case C) with
constant models and adaptive models. Constant models
are trained only once on the superset of the initial query
set and the first-day unknown query set, including the con-
stant SVM model and the constant stacking model. Five
adaptive models are also tested: an adaptive model com-
bining both stacking and SVM HYBRID in our proposed
AMODS, an adaptive SVM model, SS, ES, random selec-
tion, and SVM AL, which is an existing effective adaptive
learning method (see Section 3.2.1). All the models in Ex-
periment 3 are implemented in AMODS to carry out the
ten-day detection with same predefined parameters as in
Experiment 2, except that SS and SVM AL are required to
obtain at most 150 important queries on each day, namely,
M≤150.
Figure 10 depicts the process of SS in regard to the
number of queries within the SVM margin (SS Margin),
within the confusing region (SS Confusing), and obtained
as suspicions (SS Suspicion) separately. SVM AL is al-
so shown about the number of queries within the margin
(AL Margin). They all present a decreasing trend. In com-
parison with SVM AL, important queries obtained by SS
(SS Suspicion) are constantly fewer than those obtained
by SVM AL (the smaller of AL Margin and 150). Howev-
er, queries within the margin in SS are always fewer than
those i SVM AL, which means the uncertainty of the de-
tection model in SS is smaller than that in SVM AL. This
phenomenon implies that SS is superior to SVM AL in
reducing classifier uncertainty.
F-values of the eight detection approaches are exhibited
in Figure 11. Among the five methods, random selection
shows the worst performance and constantly fluctuates.
The failure of random selection is attributed to the trivial
probability of a randomly selected query being informa-
tive or representative. The constant SVM model and the
constant stacking model perform better only than random
selection; similar trends of the three methods also indi-
cate that randomly selected queries make little contribu-
tion to detection performance improvement. Yet, for the
five adaptive methods, steep uptrend is shown for the first
three days and then steady uptrend for the remaining days.
Detection performance improvement of AMODS over con-
stant methods suggests that AMODS is able to effectively
leverage existing knowledge, including knowledge gained
during the adaptive detection process, toward enhanced
subsequent detection of queries. Moreover, AMODS a-
long with SS outperforms other adaptive methods. The
improvement of AMODS over the adaptive SVM model
implies the stronger classification ability of stacking over
single classifiers. The superiority of AMODS mainly lies in
that it employs SVM HYBRID, which combines the con-
tributions of SS and ES while also mitigating their limita-
tions. Both SS and ES boost the performance of AMODS.
Furthermore, SS outperforms ES, which demostrates that
suspicions make a valuable contribution to an accurate de-
tection model, as validated in Figure 7. SS also outper-
forms SVM AL, even though SS obtains fewer important
queries, as shown in Figure 10. This phenomenon reveals
the advantage of SS over SVM AL: SS requires less manual
labeling work and achieves better detection performance.
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Table 9: Comparisons of web attack detection methods
Method F-value(%) TP rate (%) FP rate (%)
Linear combination [10] 71.73 92.39 0.61
Wavelet transform [14] 61.04 82.61 0.81
Dimensionality reduction [15] 70.48 86.96 0.56
Adaptive learning (AMODS) 94.79 98.91 0.09
The main weakness of SVM AL is its ignorance of density
distribution of unknown samples, which leads to sample
bias, while SS preserves the density distribution by using
K-medoids clustering to obtain suspicions.
Figure 12 compares the number of truly malicious
queries obtained by the six adaptive detection method-
s. Random selection still performs the worst. AMODS,
together with ES and the adaptive SVM model, outper-
forms other methods, with a total number of 715, 656 and
615 malicious queries obtained respectively. The adap-
tive SVM model lags behind among the top three meth-
ods, which demonstrates the strong detection ability of
the stacking-based detection model. Moreover, the rea-
son why ES falls short of AMODS lies in that SS ben-
efits the detection performance of AMODS, which lead-
s AMODS to obtain more correctly-classified exemplars
than ES does. Generally, AMODS, ES and the adaptive
SVM model show an uptrend, while SS and SVM AL show
a downtrend. This distinction is due to the difference in
their preference for queries. AMODS, ES and the adap-
tive SVM model prefer queries that are highly likely to
be malicious, while SS and SVM AL prefer queries that
the classifier is uncertain about, and thus might not be
malicious. The reduction in uncertain queries leads to a
decline in malicious queries obtained by SS and SVM AL.
During the ten-day detection, the total number of mali-
cious queries obtained by AMODS (715) is 2.78 times and
59.58 times that by SVM AL (257) and random selection
(12) respectively. This demonstrates the overwhelming a-
bility of AMODS in harvesting malicious queries.
In conclusion, Experiment 3 demonstrates that adap-
tive learning can further enhance malicious query detec-
tion performance over constant models. Experiment re-
sults reveal the advantages of AMODS, SS and ES over
SVM AL, constant models and random selection in two
respects: improving detection performance and obtaining
more malicious queries. AMODS wins in both respects a-
mong all the methods. SS does well in the former respect,
while ES excels in the latter. Both SS and ES defeat other
methods except for AMODS in their respective strengths.
5.4. Experiment 4: comparisons with related work
In the context of web attack detection, existing meth-
ods are all constant and thus cannot adapt to the change
of malicious behaviors. Our proposed adaptive detection
method is capable of detecting the latest attacks by incre-
mentally updating the detection model.
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Figure 13: Comparisons of web attack detection methods
Experiment 4 aims at comparing AMODS with exist-
ing detection methods. However, our proposed method
cannot be directly compared with them, since there is no
public data available for web attack detection and existing
works all used their own datasets for evaluation. The only
labeled, publicly available trace in intrusion detection is
DARPA 1999 [53], whose HTTP traffic is not appropri-
ate for web attack detection, because it does not contain
many web attacks [54]. For this reason, we use our dataset
to test existing web attack detection methods, including
linear combination [10], wavelet transform [14] and dimen-
sionality reduction [15].
We set the anomaly threshold of [10] to the default 10%
larger than the maximum anomaly score seen during train-
ing. [10] is conducted on our ten unknown sets within 10-
fold cross validation. Since [10] uses normal traffic to build
the detection model, malicious queries in the training set
of each fold are removed. [14] and [15] are unsupervised,
so do not require a training phase. We set their anoma-
ly threshold to 0.92%, the percentage of malicious queries
in our dataset. TW2D-BA is used to perform [14], while
PCA along with RM is used to implement [15]. [14] and
[15] are implemented on each unknown dataset, and their
performance is averaged separately.
Table 9 and Figure 13 compare the detection perfor-
mance of AMODS with the three web attack detection
methods. The comparison results illustrate that our
method is the overall winner and significantly beats the
other methods, achieving the highest F-value (94.79%) and
TP rate (98.91%), as well as the lowest FP rate (0.09%)
among them. Among the three methods, [10] obtain-
s the highest F-value (71.73%) and the highest TP rate
(92.39%). However, they are still lower than the lowest
F-value and TP rate obtained by AMODSon the 10th day,
namely 91.67% and 95.65%. Moreover, their lowest FP
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rate (0.56%) is higher than the highest of SVM HYRBID
on the 10th day (0.17%).
We attribute the success of AMODS to the princi-
ple of SVM HYBRID, namely, choosing both the most
important prone-to-be-misclassified queries (suspicions)
and the most representative malicious queries (exemplars)
from unknown queries. By incrementally incorporating
correctly-labeled suspicions and exemplars into the train-
ing pool to update the detection model, its detection abil-
ity is greatly enhanced. The detection model is up-to-date
and capable of detecting the most recent unknown attack-
s.
6. Discussion
In this paper, we propose an adaptive learning strategy
called SVM HYBRID for the efficient selection of impor-
tant queries, and develop a malicious query detection sys-
tem that can adaptively update the detection model with
a small manual labeling workload. In this section, we clar-
ify some relevant issues of our approach and discuss the
limitations of our approach.
Labeling unknown queries. Manually labeling the
112,397 queries in web requests is time-consuming and
error-prone. Therefore, we initially used the rules of Mod-
Security to detect attacks automatically. Then we manual-
ly confirmed the detected attacks, and concluded that the
TP rate and FP rate of the detection results was 33.37%
and 8.64%. To decipher the reason for the unsatisfacto-
ry detection results, we manually checked the ModSecu-
rity rule set and found that some rules matched queries
with simple malicious code snippets, which might appear
in normal queries, resulting in false positives. Malicious
queries that contain rare or complex malicious code snip-
pets do not match any rules, and might evade the detec-
tion, leading to false negatives. This demonstrates the
necessity of updating the WAF signature library, which
can be achieved by acquiring the latest malicious queries
via our system.
Code obfuscation. As mentioned above, we labeled un-
known queries using static analysis, which might be by-
passed by attacks using code obfuscation. Code obfusca-
tion could deteriorate the detection performance of stat-
ic techniques, so we needed to eliminate the impact on
AMODS. To this end, we assumed that queries with ob-
fuscated code were malicious and made no further analysis
on them. This operation is rational, because the reason for
obfuscation in web requests is to evade detection, and it
is futile to obfuscate benign web requests. If necessary,
dynamic analysis could be applied to defend against code
obfuscation. Dynamic techniques can monitor the code
that is actually executed by the application, and thus are
immune to many code-obfuscating transformations.
Web application concept drift. In machine learning,
changes in the modeled behaviors of an observed object
are known as concept drift [55]. Maggi et al. [56] defined
the behaviors of a web application as functionalities that
the application offers and, more specifically, the content
of web requests and responses. They also defined the sig-
nificant changes that frequently happen to behaviors of a
web application as web application concept drift. Web ap-
plication concept drift is common nowadays because web
applications become increasingly multi-featured to satisfy
users’ needs. If web application concept drift is unknown
to the web attack detection model, the model might mis-
classify the latest normal behaviors of the application after
an update, leading to false positives. Therefore, by keep-
ing track of the FP rate of the daily-updated detection
model on the original ten-day query set, our system could
also be used to sense concept drift. The FP rate increased
dramatically on queries on the 6th day; therefore it is like-
ly that the web application concept drift occurred on this
day. We confirmed our speculation by analyzing logs and
contacting the site manager. The website was upgraded
on the 6th day: a new category for news was established,
which caused the query structure in requests to the links
in the new category to change, with new parameter names.
Future work. For future research, we intend to apply
deep learning to discover more previously unknown attack
features to replace N -gram features, since N -grams strug-
gle to interpret attack patterns. We also plan to enable
AMODS to perform in a fully automatic manner without
human supervision while maintaining its high detection
rate, though at present it only requires a trivial amount of
manual labeling work: 0.15% (150 out of 100,000) of the
entire unknown queries. An intuitive solution is unsuper-
vised learning. Beyond that, AMODS is currently limited
to detecting malicious queries in web attacks. Neverthe-
less, it has excellent potential for use in network intrusion
detection. Comprehensive evaluation will be conducted to
capture the performance of AMODS in this area.
7. Conclusion
Queries in web requests can be exploited by attackers to
conduct attacks against web servers and web applications.
This paper introduces a novel adaptive system for detect-
ing malicious queries, called AMODS. It is, to the best of
our knowledge, the first research into adaptive detection
in the field of web attack detection. AMODS takes daily
web traffic as input, and models queries in web requests.
The core of AMODS, named SVM HYBRID, an adap-
tive learning approach, serves to reduce manual work by
choosing important queries for labeling. SVM HYBRID
is a hybrid of Suspicion Selection (SS) and Exemplar Se-
lection (ES). SS obtains the most important informative
queries and features in improving detection performance,
while ES specializes in harvesting truly malicious queries.
Queries obtained by SVM HYBRID are incrementally in-
corporated into the training pool to update the detection
model. Malicious queries obtained could also be used to
update the WAF signature library. AMODS was tested
on the real-world ten-day query set of an academic insti-
tute. Experiments show that AMODS outperforms SVM
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AL in terms of both the detection performance and the
number of malicious queries obtained. AMODS also leads
existing web attack detection methods on our dataset with
the highest F-value of 94.79% and the lowest FP-rate of
0.09%.
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